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From Pariah to Power: The Berlin Election of 2001 and the PDS Question 
 
In 2001 Berlin’s grand coalition collapsed in dramatic circumstances, leading to a Land election 
which attracted unprecedented attention within the Federal Republic and beyond.  The entire 
campaign was dominated by one question, namely could the post-communist PDS gain a share of 
power in the city that embodied the victory of the capitalist west over the communist east?  This article 
outlines the background to the election, and examines the campaigns of all the main parties.  It then 
analyses the results, with comparisons between the east and west of the city, and examines the process 
that finally resulted in the formation of a red-red coalition government.  It concludes with a 
consideration of the significance of the election results for all the parties concerned and for German 
politics.  Overall, the election suggests that ‘inner unity’ may well be unattainable in Berlin, and that 
an acceptance of the city’s diversity may be the way forward for its politicians. 
 
Until 2001 local politics in Berlin was regarded as unfeasibly provincial and of remarkably little 
interest to the rest of the country.  Although in the past, Berlin politicians such as Willy Brandt, Ernst 
Reuter and Richard von Weizsäcker, rose to national prominence, in recent years the German capital’s 
politicians retained an unusually low profile compared with their counterparts in London, Paris or New 
York.  Prior to German reunification this was largely due to West Berlin’s remoteness from the rest of 
the Federal Republic and its special status.  But even since then the provincial image has stuck, partly 
because the federal government remained in Bonn for a further nine years.  The fact that the political 
dynamics of the reunited city seemed to have made a grand coalition inevitable after every election 
hardly encouraged interest in its politics and elections.  However all this changed in 2001 with a Land 
election that started and ended amid controversy.  Ironically the misdemeanours of the Berlin Christian 
Democratic Union (CDU) facilitated the transition of the post-communist Party of Democratic 
Socialism (PDS) from pariah to power.  Although the election campaign was overshadowed by the 
terrorist attacks of September 11th in America, the ‘PDS question’ dominated the campaign period.  
The taboo surrounding the participation of the PDS in Land governments in the new Länder had 
already been broken in Mecklenburg-Vorpommern and to a certain extent, in Sachsen-Anhalt.  But 
Berlin was different.  It is the only East-West Land, and as such is a microcosm of unified Germany.  
Furthermore, it is the federal capital with an international image to cultivate.  Thus the ‘new’ PDS 
question concerned the appropriateness of the PDS as a coalition partner beyond the eastern Länder 
with obvious implications for the country as a whole, especially just a year before a federal election.  
As a consequence this particular Berlin election received unprecedented attention from the nation’s 
media.  This article outlines the background to the election, and examines the campaigns of all the main 
parties.  It then analyses the results, with comparisons between the east and west of the city, and 
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examines the process that finally resulted in the formation of a red-red coalition government.  The 
article concludes with a consideration of the significance of the election for Berlin and for German 
politics as a whole. 
 
THE END OF THE GRAND COALITION 
 
Since 1990, Berlin had been governed by a grand coalition, for which there was little enthusiasm but 
apparently no alternative.  This was partly because a large proportion of the vote was won by a party 
not considered suitable for inclusion in a coalition, namely the PDS, and because the FDP had failed to 
gain seats in the Berlin parliament since 1995.  Even so, few would have predicted that the grand 
coalition would collapse so dramatically.   
  The Berlin CDU had been dominated by two individuals since the early 1980s, namely the chair and 
governing mayor, Eberhard Diepgen, and the formidable leader of the parliamentary party, Klaus 
Landowsky.  Landowsky also had a lucrative position on the board of the Berlin Hyp bank, in which 
the Land Berlin was the majority shareholder.  In February 2001 it emerged that Landowsky had 
received two payments of 20,000 DM from the directors of a company that had received a 600 million 
DM loan from the Berlin Hyp.  The donations been channelled into accounts held by the Berlin CDU 
without being recorded as Germany’s party finance law required. These revelations led to calls for 
Landowsky to resign from his political and commercial positions, which he initially resisted.  Even 
after he had bowed to pressure to resign, Diepgen attempted to keep him on as deputy chair of the 
party.  The final straw for the junior coalition partner, the SPD, came in the form of revelations 
regarding various investment disasters by the Berlin Hyp, the cost of which would be borne by the 
Land itself, further deepening Berlin’s financial crisis.  As a consequence, in June, the SPD finally 
withdrew from the grand coalition and called for new elections.  However, in order to achieve this the 
parliament would have to dissolve itself via a vote of no confidence in Diepgen and the other senators.1  
The necessary majority could only be obtained with the support of the PDS.  The SPD leadership 
decided to break the taboo on co-operation with the post-communists, and together with the Greens, the 
three left-of-centre parties voted Diepgen and the CDU-led senate out of office on 16 June 2001.  The 
parliament then voted in a transitional red-green minority senate, ‘tolerated’ by the PDS, which would 
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govern until new elections were held.  The new governing mayor was Klaus Wowereit, leader of the 
SPD in the Berlin Parliament. 
 
THE ELECTION CAMPAIGNS 
 
For two reasons the election of 2001 focused heavily on personalities as opposed to policies.  Firstly, 
coming just two years after the previous election, the parties had few new solutions to Berlin’s 
problems, hence the policy content of their manifestos differed little from those of 1999.2  The main 
difference was in vocabulary, with all the parties emphasising ‘renewal’, ‘the future’, and ‘new 
energy’.  The second reason was the media attention aroused by the candidature of Gregor Gysi for the 
PDS. With the danger that the charismatic Gysi would steal the limelight, all the other parties were 
forced to concentrate on promoting their mayoral candidates (Spitzenkandidaten), and all seemed to 
regard discrediting Gysi as their primary objective, as opposed to challenging each other. 
   Although polls suggested that the SPD would be the largest party in the new Berlin parliament, they 
also predicted that together, the SPD and Greens were unlikely to win a majority, hence neither party 
could avoid the ‘PDS question’.  For the Greens, this was particularly problematic, since they are 
technically Alliance 90/the Greens following the merger with the East German civil rights activists of 
the reunification period.  However the significance of the latter has inevitably diminished over time, 
and the party is numerically dominated by West Berliners.  In short, the election was not just a matter 
of choices for the voters, but also for politicians themselves. 
   The PDS had increased its share of the vote in every Berlin election, culminating in a result of 17.7 
per cent in 1999.  While its strongholds lie in Eastern Berlin, support in Western Berlin has grown too, 
aided by its relatively liberal and cosmopolitan culture, and it is regarded by some as a testing ground 
for the expansion of the PDS into western Germany.  For the first time in reunited Berlin, the PDS 
fought the 2001 election as a potential party of government.  As a consequence, campaign literature 
focused on policies as opposed to ideology,3 and the competence and expertise of individual politicians 
was promoted.  Several other factors worked to the PDS’s advantage.  Firstly, it has seats on many 
local councils in both halves of the city, and has around 14,600 members there, with no shortage of 
those with the time and dedication to undertake campaign work.  Secondly, the Berlin PDS has several 
well-known faces, whereas local politicians from other parties are unknown beyond the city and retain 
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an image of provinciality.  Opinion polls showed that Gysi had the highest recognition rating among all 
the mayoral candidates,4 and that the proportion of Berliners who would chose him as major if they 
could elect one directly, was considerably higher than the proportion who normally voted PDS.5   
  Gysi claimed it was Eberhard Diepgen who had first dared him to stand for the position of governing 
mayor of Berlin.6  His campaign began even before the election date had been finalised, with the 
establishment of his campaign headquarters, the GysiWahlQuartier, and his own website, (www.take-
it-gysi.de).  From the start he appeared to be driven by personal ambition and behaved as though it 
were a direct election, an idea he supported.7  His sense of self-importance was apparent in his ‘all of 
nothing’ approach to the election.  If he could not at least be a senator in the Berlin government he 
would stay in the Bundestag rather than becoming a humble member of the Berlin parliament.8  
Overall, Gysi’s own campaign appeared quite separate from that of the local party, and the 
GysiWahlQuartier was not located in the party’s headquarters.  Although for the media Gysi embodied 
the PDS, in reality he remained highly unrepresentative of the party at Land level, even admitting 
himself that there was a ‘useful difference’ between the party and himself.9  
  According to Gysi, a good result for the PDS would be at least 20 per cent, and to gain over 5 percent 
in the west of the city would enhance the party’s legitimacy.  He repeatedly stated the party’s objective 
of beating the SPD into second place.10  Keen to boost his fortunes in the West, Gysi utilised a 
common tactic in Berlin elections, namely appealing to Berliners’ pride in their home city.  Conscious 
that many people regarded the PDS as a divisive force in the capital, he declared, ‘I stand for bridges 
not walls’,11 and in interviews and party material made frequent references to the need to unite the city. 
He aimed to clarify Berlin’s role as federal capital within the Bund12, although later admitted that this 
issue was of little interest to Berliners.13  For the first time, the PDS used a Land list, with Gysi in first 
place, as opposed to separate lists in each borough (Bezirk).14  The Gysi campaign was backed up by a 
range of promotional materials – pens, lighters, CDs, even stickers and umbrellas with the slogan ‘I ♥ 
Gy’.15 However, by the end of an exhausting personal campaign the media were starting to refer to the 
‘demystification’ of Gysi16 who began to show signs of being human after all.  
  The local party campaigned on their usual issues, in particular, social justice, and social and economic 
problems common to both sides of the city such as unemployment.17   Not surprisingly, much emphasis 
was also placed on the need to banish corruption from Berlin politics, and to deal with the city’s 
catastrophic financial situation.18 However, following the events of September 11th 2001, the Berlin 
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PDS’s campaign was overshadowed by the foreign policy of the federal PDS.  Since entering the 
federal government in 1998 the Greens had been party to several foreign policy decisions that had 
outraged some Green supporters, most notably during the Kosovo crisis of 1999.  This gave the PDS 
the opportunity to promote itself as Germany’s new peace party.19  But the events of September 11th 
caused widespread sympathy for America, and support for the PDS, a post-communist party often 
critical of American foreign policy, fell.  Once the US-led bombing of Afghanistan began, however, 
supported by the German government, the PDS’s fortunes were revived as they were able to regain 
support from those who did not approve of this course of action.20  Overall, the PDS claimed to have 
spent almost 2 million DM on the election campaign, 1.7 million DM coming directly from the federal 
party, of which 200,000 DM went directly to Gysi’s campaign headquarters.21 
  The CDU entered the campaign in very different circumstances to previous elections.  For nearly two 
decades the party had been led by Diepgen, a rather grey, provincial politician with a surprising ability 
to lead the CDU to victory.  Due to the circumstances that caused the end of the CDU-led grand 
coalition, it was imperative that the party be led by a new face, not connected with the recent past.  The 
party in Berlin has never been close to the federal party leadership, largely due to West Berlin’s 
political and geographical isolation, and in 2001 new tension erupted between the two over the choice 
of mayoral candidate.  The federal leadership sought to impose former party chairman, Wolfgang 
Schäuble, but the Berlin party successfully resisted, choosing instead Frank Steffel, a 35 year old 
businessman who had recently taken over as leader of the parliamentary party in the capital.  This 
incident further damaged the image of the federal party chair, Angela Merkel, whose leadership 
qualities had already been in doubt.  Even former Chancellor Kohl had supported Steffel as opposed to 
Schäuble.22  So little known was Steffel that even the CDU’s own campaign material began with the 
line, ‘People ask who Frank Steffel is...’23  
  Since the grand coalition had left Berlin with debts of over DM 70 million (€35million), the CDU’s 
campaign emphasised the future and not the party’s record.  Much importance was attached to Steffel’s 
successful business career and by implication, his economic competence. Later on in the campaign, 
more emphasis was placed on security and law and order, but the issue failed to dominate as it had 
done in Hamburg a few months earlier, bringing victory for the hard-line Schill Party. As in previous 
campaigns with Diepgen, campaign literature gave information about the candidate’s hobbies and 
lifestyle, and his wife, Katja, featured prominently.  However Steffel was widely regarded as the 
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political prodigy of the discredited Klaus Landowsky,24 which weakened his image as the embodiment 
of a new start for Berlin.  Steffel had described the no confidence vote in Diepgen as ‘the darkest day 
for Berlin since the building of the Berlin wall’25 and called him ‘mayor of hearts’.26 
  As before, the CDU portrayed itself as the Hauptstadtpartei, this time with the slogan ‘New strength 
for Berlin’,27 reinforced with fortifying campaign materials such as energy drinks, glucose tablets and 
muesli bars, all sporting CDU slogans.  Party activists were reminded how the SPD and Greens, in 
league with ‘the communists’, had toppled Eberhard Diepgen ‘with a brutal hunger for power’,28 
something their campaign manager claimed the SPD had been plotting for some time.29  High-tech 
campaign materials aimed to ‘generate dynamism and excitement’, and both the message and the 
medium were to reflect ‘renewal and youth’.  Special clothing was produced for campaign teams 
featuring hooded jackets and baseball caps.30  Funding for the campaign was tight though, due to the 
recent financial scandal, and the federal party was not in a position to contribute much either.  It did 
however lend the Berlin party office space for their campaign headquarters, ‘Powerpoint Steffel’. 
  While the Berlin CDU claimed they would not be waging a ‘red-socks’ campaign against the PDS, the 
party did have a long history of anti-communism, both before and after reunification. Election material 
claimed the SPD secretly favoured a red-red senate, as opposed to red-green, and stressed that only a 
vote for the CDU would ensure there would be no governing role for the PDS in Berlin.  An SPD/PDS 
coalition would apparently be ‘a betrayal of the past and wrong for the future’31 and would jeopardise 
the city’s economic recovery.32  Even Helmut Kohl threatened to join in the election campaign to 
prevent the PDS gaining a share of power in Berlin, provoking virulent criticism from foreign minister, 
Joschka Fischer, who accused him of ‘unbelievable western arrogance’ and of trying to divide the city 
again.33  CDU material also attacked the federal PDS, highlighting the crimes of the SED, and alleging 
links with Germany’s violent left-wing scene.  
  With the CDU already fighting the election from a difficult position, various embarrassing incidents 
and badly chosen words by the mayoral candidate himself only served to make matters worse.  Firstly, 
it was alleged that Steffel had made racist remarks in his late teens, remarks he failed to deny 
convincingly.34  Secondly, in an interview, he said that Munich (as opposed to Berlin) was the most 
beautiful city in Germany.35  Thirdly, pictures of Steffel seeking refuge behind the Bavarian Minister-
President, Edmund Stoiber, while being pelted with eggs at a key election rally hardly enhanced his 
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image.  Finally, the inclusion of former East German Politburo member, Günter Schabowski, in a CDU 
focus group on inner unity raised some eyebrows.   
  The SPD had good reasons to enter into the election campaign optimistically.  By daring to break the 
taboo surrounding cooperation with the PDS, Klaus Wowereit had finally released the CDU’s 
stranglehold on power in the capital.  At long last the SPD had the advantage of the incumbent’s bonus, 
which Wowereit was judged to have made good use of.36    The party had found a candidate who was a 
‘talented communicator’37 and not a ‘has-been’.  The lack of appeal of their mayoral candidates in 
1999 and 1995 had certainly contributed to the abysmal defeats the party suffered at both elections.  In 
the view of one journalist, Wowereit represented a more modern SPD: ‘The 47 year old lawyer 
personifies a break with the party milieu: smart, at the centre of the here and now of the capital’s 
culture, and totally free from the grey tones of ÖTV circles’.38   
  However, a variety of factors could have worked against the SPD.  Firstly, having been part of the 
grand coalition since 1990, the SPD could hardly claim to be blameless for the city’s debts.  Secondly, 
many people did not approve of the means used to topple the CDU.  Thirdly, like his CDU opponent, 
the new SPD mayor was hardly a household name, and was dubbed ‘Werwiewowereit’ by the media.39  
Finally there was the issue of Wowereit’s homosexuality, which he declared at a special party 
conference to the surprise of some Social Democratic MPs.40  The party decided to turn this to their 
advantage and Wowereit’s own phrase, ‘I’m gay – and that’s good’,41 became a key slogan of the 
campaign, featuring in leaflets and the party’s election website address (www.spd-und-das-ist-gut-
so.de).  Wowereit was portrayed as embodying Berlin’s liberal and multifaceted culture, which 
encompassed a range of different lifestyles. Campaign material called him ‘the right man to conquer 
the wall in people’s heads and to bring together Berliners with different life experiences’.42   While the 
CDU made no direct references to Wowereit’s personal life, the prominence of Katja Steffel during the 
campaign certainly appeared to be an attempt to make a distinction between their candidate’s lifestyle 
and Wowereit’s.43  Nevertheless, the new mayor did come in for some criticism due to his frequent 
appearances at social gatherings, earning him the nickname of the ‘regierender Partymeister’.44  Apart 
from ruling out another Grand Coalition, Wowereit kept his options open with regard to the other three 
parties.  However, whether or not the Berlin party would be given a free hand to make the decision by 
the federal party leadership remained to be seen. 
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  More than any other party Alliance 90/the Greens marketed themselves as the anti-corruption party 
and made excessive use of metaphors to do with cleanliness and washing.  Campaign material featured 
the slogan ‘We’ll make election day laundry day and will do away with sleaze and corruption’.  The 
key feature of the Greens’ election paraphernalia were boxes of real (environmentally friendly) 
washing powder labelled ‘corruption detergent with red-red block’, to reinforce the party’s claim that a 
vote for the Greens would reduce the likelihood of PDS participation in Berlin’s government.45  
Having previously resisted pressure to conduct a media campaign, for the first time, the Greens 
reluctantly accepted that they would have to compete on the other parties’ terms with their own 
candidate for mayor.46 After losing some of their best known faces to federal and European politics, the 
Berlin Greens chose 39 year old Sibyll Klotz, an east Berliner, to front their campaign.  However, with 
the spotlight on Gysi, Wowereit, and to a lesser extent, Steffel, the Greens tended to get marginalised, 
in spite of being part of the transitional governing coalition.   
   The Greens’ campaign was also overshadowed by ‘the PDS question’.  The two parties had shared 
the burden of opposition to the grand coalition in the Berlin parliament for over a decade and had 
numerous policies in common.  But the possibility of formal cooperation had been a contentious issue 
within the party for some time, especially among the few remaining members of Alliance 90, and the 
grassroots had only approved co-operation as a last resort to bring down the grand coalition.  
Furthermore the PDS’s attempts to take on the mantel of peace party had increased the level of rivalry 
between the two parties.  The allied bombing in Afghanistan, approved by the red-green coalition at 
federal level, occurred at a particularly inopportune moment for the Berlin Greens’ campaign.  Other 
factors were also likely to affect the Greens’ ability to increase their support.  Firstly, the party was 
unlikely to gain votes from former CDU voters.  Secondly, apart from having the only female mayoral 
candidate,47 the Berlin Greens were losing their distinctiveness on the left of the political spectrum.  
Finally, the party had retained its western ‘Kreuzberg culture’ which has limited appeal in eastern 
Berlin. 
  For the FDP the humiliation of the Berlin CDU and the unexpected election provided an opportunity 
to return to the political scene in the capital, having disappeared since 1995.  Two additional factors 
worked in the Liberals’ favour.  Firstly, the chance to portray themselves as guarantors of a left-of-
centre coalition minus the PDS, and secondly, having a reasonably well-known candidate, former 
federal minister, Günter Rexrodt, for the post of mayor, in contrast to the little-known candidates of 
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most of the other parties.  The FDP’s message was that the PDS in government would be highly 
damaging for Berlin’s economy and image, and Rexrodt described Gysi as ‘just a covergirl’.48  
However, with no record to defend and hardly any members, especially in the east of the capital, 
Rexrodt was the Berlin FDP (labelled the ‘virtual FDP’ by Die Zeit49).  Like other parties, the FDP 
portrayed itself as the embodiment of a fresh start for Berlin, with campaign gimmicks such as cans of 
energy drink emblazoned with the words ‘Rex Bull’. The party claimed to have spent under 30,000 
DM on the campaign.50  
  
THE ELECTION RESULTS 
 
TABLE 1: BERLIN ELECTION RESULTS 2001 AND 1999 
 
Party Result 2001 (%) Seats 2001 Result 1999 (%) Seats 1999 
CDU 23.8 35 40.8 76 
SPD 29.7 44 22.4 42 
PDS 22.6 33 17.7 33 
Greens 9.1 14 9.9 18 
FDP 9.9 15 2.2 0 
Far right51  2.2 0 3.5 0 
Others 2.7 0 3.5 0 
Total 100 141 100 169 
 
Source: Landeswahlleiter für Berlin 
 
  The 2001 Berlin election aroused slightly more interest among voters compared with two years 
before, with a turn out of 68.1 per cent compared with 65.5 per cent.52  In real terms there were nearly 
3,000 more eligible voters in 2001, compared with 1999, many of them ‘Neuberliner’ who had moved 
from Bonn in the intervening period.  In percentage terms, as Table 1 shows, the SPD, PDS and FDP 
all made substantial gains, though no party gained over 30 per cent of the vote.  Predictably the CDU 
was the main loser, and the Greens’ vote share hardly changed.  As many polls had predicted, the 
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transitional red-green coalition failed to gain a majority of seats, thereby reopening the coalition 
debate, and in particular, the ‘PDS question’.  However, a straightforward comparison of seat 
distribution between the 1999 and 2001 elections is not possible due to the reduction in size of the 
Berlin parliament.  As was the case in every election in Berlin since reunification, the overall results 
concealed very marked differences between the east and west of the city (see Table 2).   
 
TABLE 2: PERCENTAGE RESULTS OF THE 2001 LAND ELECTION (EAST AND WEST 
BERLIN) 
 
Party East West 
CDU 12.4 30.8 
SPD 23.2 33.7 
PDS 47.6 6.9 
FDP 5.3 12.8 
Greens 5.9 11.1 
Far Right 2.8 1.9 
 
Source: Landeswahlleiter für Berlin 
 
  At nearly 23 per cent, the PDS continued the trend of increasing its vote share in every successive 
election in Berlin since reunification, easily surpassing Gysi’s desirable figure of ‘20 per cent +’.  To 
some commentators the PDS’s surprisingly strong performance suggested that many PDS voters had 
lied to pollsters regarding their voting intentions.53  The party also claimed to have the highest level of 
support of all parties among voters aged 18-25, and among those with higher education54 a claim 
supported by independent research.55  The PDS made gains in both halves of the city, but the 
difference between the party’s eastern and western performance remained as large as ever. The party 
achieved a record 47.6 per cent of the vote (Zweitstimmen) in East Berlin, and won all 32 constituency 
seats there, with many directly elected MPs winning over 50 per cent of the vote.56  In western Berlin, 
the PDS’s vote share rose from 4.2 per cent in 1999 to 6.9 per cent, an increase of over 28,000 votes. 
Gaining over 5 per cent of the vote in West Berlin was of great symbolic significance and provided 
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encouragement for the party leadership’s controversial objective of Westausdehnung. While some PDS 
voters in the west of the city may have moved there from the east, this does not provide a satisfactory 
explanation for the party’s performance there because the number of people who have moved from one 
side of the city to the other since reunification is believed to be very small.57  
  The PDS attributed its success to four factors.  Firstly, Gysi’s charismatic leadership which appealed 
to voters beyond the party’s usual clientele.  Secondly, voters’ appreciation of the party’s work at local 
council level.  Thirdly, a strong desire for change and more social justice in the capital.  Finally, the 
party’s outspoken condemnation of the US-led military action in Afghanistan since September 11th.58  
More objective commentators agreed that two of these factors, namely Gysi himself and the 
Afghanistan crisis, had helped the PDS reach beyond its usual electorate.59  This was especially true in 
West Berlin. The party’s best result in the west was in Kreuzberg (18.7 per cent), traditionally a Green 
stronghold, suggesting the claim to be Germany’s only peace party found resonance there.60  In 
addition, the party provided an outlet for people who were generally frustrated with mainstream 
politics, for example, those who had previously voted for parties of the far right (which combined only 
polled 2.2 per cent).61   However the fact remained that the PDS’s supporters in Berlin were 
overwhelmingly located in the East of the city.   As was the case in 1999 and 1995 the party benefited 
most from the fact that it was still perceived as representing the interests of East Berliners in reunited 
Berlin’s political system.  In many outlying districts, especially those characterised by high-rise 
prefabricated flats, the PDS is not just a political party, but provides friendship, support and social 
activities with like-minded people, rather like a social club or church might in the west.  Although 
membership levels in Berlin have fallen steeply in recent years, the PDS still has an advantage over 
other Berlin parties in terms of activists.  Also the federal party has always been highly visible in 
Berlin, unlike the other federal parties, which were based in Bonn until 1999. 
   The SPD finally put an end to a string of dreadful results in Berlin during the 1990s, but failed to 
reach the levels of support many opinion polls had predicted.62  Wowereit’s personal popularity proved 
to be higher than that of his party.63  Particularly in the west of the city, a large proportion of former 
CDU voters appear to have opted instead for the FDP, which came from nowhere to take nearly 10 per 
cent of the vote.  
  For the CDU, the result was their worst ever in Berlin since the establishment of the Federal Republic.  
Researchers found that the CDU’s most loyal group, the over 60s, had deserted the party in large 
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numbers.  Many had developed a long-term sense of allegiance to Diepgen and were unimpressed by 
the young Frank Steffel.64 The result also had federal implications for the CDU as it was hardly an 
endorsement for Angela Merkel as federal party chair at a crucial time in the debate over the CDU and 
CSU’s chancellor candidate for the 2002 federal election. 
  Overall, it appeared that the result of the Berlin election had little to do with short-term policies and 
far more to do with general perceptions of the parties and their leaders.  The key determining factors 
were corruption, the foreign policy of the federal government, politicians’ lifestyles, and most of all, 
attitudes towards the PDS, and in turn, its potential allies. 
 
THE COALITION NEGOTIATIONS 
 
The election results gave the SPD three possible choices: a ‘traffic light’ coalition with the Greens and 
the FDP (with a wafer-thin majority of two seats); a coalition with the PDS (with a majority of six 
seats); or a coalition with both the Greens and the PDS (with a majority of 20).  The marked difference 
in voting behaviour in the East and West of the city made it hard for commentators to identify which 
coalition the majority of voters preferred.  Two further options had already been ruled out.  Wowereit 
had ruled out another Grand Coalition prior to the election, and Petra Pau, then chair of the Berlin PDS, 
had declared that her party would not continue to tolerate a Red-Green minority senate.65 However, 
with a federal election only a year away, all the federal parties, in particular, the SPD, had an interest in 
the outcome of the coalition negotiations.  In an interview in the French newspaper, Le Monde, 
Chancellor Schröder expressed his preference for a ‘traffic light’ coalition, and hinted that financial aid 
for the capital would be more forthcoming if this were the outcome of negotiations.66 However, Gregor 
Gysi claimed that the result was a clear mandate for PDS inclusion in government.67  To reject this 
option would mean giving up on ‘inner unity’ in the capital.68 The Berlin Greens argued among 
themselves and with the federal party over the various options.  Some rejected the red-red-green option 
from the outset because the Greens’ agenda could too easily be ignored by the other two parties.69 
  Klaus Wowereit initially held exploratory talks with all three potential coalition partners, before 
chosing the ‘traffic light’ option with the Greens and FDP. This decision predictably provoked an 
outcry from the PDS, not least because few doubted that the Berlin SPD had made the decision under 
pressure from the federal party.  Gysi said the decision was a great disappointment for East Berliners 
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and demonstrated Chancellor Schröder’s lack of interest in Eastern Germany.70  Petra Pau claimed the 
chancellor regarded PDS voters as second class voters.71  But the chair of the Berlin SPD, Peter 
Strieder, claimed the decision in favour of the ‘traffic light’ coalition would bring Berlin more allies in 
the Bundestag and Bundesrat, and as a result,72 more money from the federal government.  Groups 
representing the interests of business were also believed to have lobbied for this option.73  However, 
even within the SPD there was opposition to the decision,74 due to the tiny majority the ‘traffic light’ 
coalition would have, and because the Berlin FDP were an unknown quantity.75 Some Greens too were 
concerned about the decision to ignore the wishes of the majority of East Berliners.76  
   However, from the outset disagreements between the Greens and the FDP were apparent, particularly 
with regard to the budget crisis and transport, housing and cultural policies.  After nearly a month of 
negotiations, the talks collapsed at the beginning of December, with the Greens stubbornly declaring 
six points to be non-negotiable and the FDP refusing to accept tax rises on property, beverages and 
motorboats to help reduce Berlin’s debts.  The federal chair of the Greens labelled the FDP the ‘party 
of social insensitivity’77 and the SPD blamed both of the smaller parties for the breakdown of 
negotiations.78  Meanwhile the Berlin CDU suggested that the SPD had always hoped the talks would 
collapse so they would have an excuse to open talks with the PDS.79  The media too suspected that 
Wowereit and Strieder had privately favoured a coalition with the PDS all along,80 an accusation 
Strieder denied.81 
  Within a few days of the collapse of talks with the FDP and Greens, coalition negotiations began 
between the SPD and PDS.  The new 28 year old chair of the Berlin PDS, Stefan Liebich, expressed his 
desire to show that ‘the PDS is not the SED’, and the chair of the Berlin SPD claimed the PDS’s 
declaration condemning the construction of the Berlin Wall in August had made the coalition talks 
possible.82  Former federal president, Richard von Weizsäcker welcomed the negotiations, saying it 
was ‘democratically honest’ for the two parties with the most support in each half of the city to govern 
together.83   In addition, two-way negotiations were perhaps bound to be easier than three-way, and 
their respective election results meant the two parties could negotiate more as equals.84  However, 
eastern German members of the SPD continued to oppose the red-red coalition,85 and there were 
widespread fears that PDS participation in the government of Berlin would deter investors, especially 
American companies.86 The question of how to tackle Berlin’s financial crisis was inevitably the 
toughest issue, with the SPD hoping to save €1 billion in public sector personnel costs – a likely bone 
 13
of contention due to the PDS’s high level of support among public sector workers in the east of the 
capital.  Other difficult decisions concerned the further development of Schönefeld airport (agreed), 
and a possible bid for the Olympic games in 2012 (rejected).   
  The coalition negotiations were finalised within two weeks, compared with the six weeks the SPD had 
spent negotiating with the Greens and FDP to no avail.  In spite of the haste, the resulting coalition 
agreement ran to over 100 pages, with a six-page preamble.  This was double the length of the 
agreement reached between the SPD and Greens at federal election in 1998.87  Key points included the 
aim of inner unity within the city, equal opportunities between east and west, and equal recognition of 
the different biographies of Berliners and their particular social and cultural achievements.  Much 
importance was placed on the significance of the role of the capital for the Federal Republic as a whole, 
which appeared to be a thinly disguised appeal to the federal government for financial support.  A 
crucial section recognised the ‘everlasting guilt of the SED’, including the forced merger of the SPD 
and KPD in 1946, the crushing of the 1953 workers’ uprising, and the Berlin Wall and its 
consequences.  By distancing itself from the crimes of the SED and by working through its history, the 
PDS had apparently taken important steps towards its renewal.  In the words of the preamble, ‘the past 
must not be allowed to govern the future indefinitely’.  With regard to the financial crisis, the 
agreement committed the coalition to stop the accumulation of any new debts by 2009, and stressed 
that the city was integrated into the ‘community of western values’ to placate wary investors. Finally, 
the two parties stated their commitment to strive for a fusion with the surrounding land of Brandenburg 
by the end of the decade – a U-turn on the part of the PDS who had opposed the proposal in 1996.88 
  With the coalition treaty signed the last remaining task was the allocation of portfolios with in the 
Berlin senate.  Not surprisingly, media attention focused on the question of which ministry Gregor Gysi 
would head.  In the end, the PDS was given three ministries, the SPD five.  Gysi became economics 
minister (and deputy governing mayor of Berlin), a controversial decision, not least due to his lack of 
experience in the area, and the PDS also took over the health ministry and culture and science ministry. 
Only two of the eight senators were East Berliners.89   
  The new senate was formally elected on 17 January 2002, although few senators gained the support of 
all SPD and PDS MPs.90  This formality marked the final stage in the remarkable transformation of 
Berlin politics from a seemingly interminable grand coalition of no interest to anyone outside the 
capital, to a groundbreaking red-red coalition in the city that symbolised the victory of the capitalist 
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west over the communist east.  Although 52.3 per cent of Berliners had voted for one or other of the 
two governing parties, in the east of the city, 70.8 per cent had done so, compared with only 40.6 per 
cent in the west.91   Opposition to the red-red senate continued, led by the Berlin CDU and newspapers 
owned by the Axel Springer Press.  A handful of SPD members tore up their party membership cards in 
public to protest against the ‘blood red’ alliance.92  Other controversial questions remained, for 
example, should groups within the Berlin PDS still be observed by the Office for the Protection of the 
Constitution now that the party was in government?  Five weeks after the new city government was 
sworn in, the interior senator, Körting, declared the PDS to be loyal to the constitution.93  Also, would 
the obligatory ‘Stasi vetting’ procedure of the new senators cause tension between the two coalition 
partners?  The results were not to be made public.  These controversies in the capital were (and are) 
merely local manifestations of a much bigger question in German politics today, namely to what extent 
is the PDS now a ‘normal’ party? 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
The Berlin election of 2001 was of great significance, both for the city itself, and for German politics in 
a broader sense.  The winners included the SPD, at long last regaining the position of largest party, and 
the FDP, making a surprise comeback to Berlin politics, albeit in unusual circumstances.  But the real 
winner was clearly the PDS, which had made the transition from pariah to power thanks to the 
misdemeanours of its arch rival, the CDU.  The Christian Democrats were clearly the greatest losers in 
the election.  The whole episode was a tragic end to the career of one of the Federal Republic’s most 
successful Land politicians, Eberhard Diepgen.  Berlin CDU’s financial scandal was an unwelcome 
addition to the catalogue of corruption connected with the CDU as a whole since the exposure of 
‘Kohlgate’ in 1999.  Finally the Greens too could be considered to be losers of the election, since their 
role as coalition partners in Berlin proved to be extremely short. 
  The consequences of the formation of a red-red coalition were potentially far reaching. By answering 
the ‘PDS question’ in the reunited capital, questions arose regarding possible future cooperation 
between the SPD and PDS at federal level, something Chancellor Schröder was quick to rule out with a 
federal election just months away.  Whether or not the presence of the PDS in the Berlin senate puts off 
investors, may well depend on the party’s behaviour in government.  It will also be interesting to see 
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whether the shift from opposition to government in the city curtails the growth of support for the PDS. 
For the CDU, the disasters of 2001 may prove to be the catalyst for renewal that some would regard as 
long overdue after years of domination by the double act of Diepgen and Landowsky.  In the spring of 
2002, Diepgen finally withdrew from politics and the search began for a new party chair. Frank Steffel 
declined to stand for the position.  
  The election result also highlighted the fact that economically, socially, politically and 
psychologically, Berlin remains far from united.  It is still hard to make generalisations about the city 
without reference to contrasts between the east and west.  Throughout the 1990s, the so-called ‘wall in 
the head’ was translated into a ‘wall at the ballot box’94 in Berlin, and this shows no sign of 
diminishing if one compares election results from both halves of the city.  The establishment of the first 
red-red coalition in the capital, eleven years after reunification, appears to be an acknowledgement of 
the fact that Berlin comprises two different communities, and that in the interest of fairness, some kind 
of cross-community power-sharing arrangement is necessary, as is the case in other divided societies. 
  How the new government will cope with Berlin’s many problems remains to be seen.  The financial 
crisis is the most pressing issue, followed by unemployment, which is almost as high as in the five 
eastern Länder.  In addition, the city’s role as capital of the Federal Republic needs to be clarified with 
the federal government.   What is certain is that the political culture of Berlin will be fundamentally 
changed by the creation of a red-red government.  It will become more left-wing, and more eastern, and 
more in keeping with the Berlin of the past where radical ideas, alternative lifestyles and flamboyance 
flourished.   
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